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Note
Western Security Bank v. Beverly Hills
Business Bank: The Vanishing Utility of
Letters of Credit in Real Estate
Transactions
A lender in California is subject to significant limits upon the
manner in which it can foreclose upon real property security, in-
cluding preclusion of a deficiency judgment after a nonjudicial
foreclosure, a one-action rule, and a security-first requirement.
These restrictions on lender recourse have made it increasingly
difficult for California lenders to attain any measure of credit en-
hancement. In Western Security Bank v. Beverly Hills Business
Bank, a California appellate court held that section 580(d) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, the anti-deficiency statute pre-
cluding a deficiency judgment after a nonjudicial foreclosure,
barred a creditor's draw on a letter of credit post-nonjudicial fore-
closure. The court left unanswered the potentially more important
question of whether section 726(a) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, the section embodying the one-action rule and security-
first requirement, would apply to a pre-foreclosure draw on a let-
ter of credit resulting in loss of the lender's real property security.
This Note concludes it would, considers the implications this will
have upon the use of letters of credit in California real estate fi-
nancing, and proposes that the California Legislature resolve this
issue by exempting letters of credit from the anti-deficiency
requirements.
INTRODUCTION
In California, a complex statutory framework limits the process by
which creditors can proceed against debt secured by real property.
Two interrelated limits are embodied in sections 580(d)1 and 726(a) 2
of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Section 580(d) precludes
a creditor proceeding by nonjudicial foreclosure from obtaining a de-
ficiency judgment.' Section 726(a) allows only one form of action by
the creditor for the enforcement of a debt secured by a mortgage or
deed of trust. As a result, a secured creditor can bring only one law-
suit to collect its debt.' A corollary to the one-action rule is the se-
curity-first principle, 5 which requires a secured creditor to proceed
against his security in its entirety before pursuing a borrower's per-
sonal estate. The combination of these provisions gives protection to
a defaulting borrower. Conversely, these provisions hinder a lender's
attempts to collect the full amount of the debt owed.6
These statutes place limits upon the credit enhancement options
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West 1994). Section 580(d) reads in pertinent
part:
No judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency upon a note secured by a
deed of trust or mortgage upon real property. . . in any case in which the real
property . . . has been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under power of sale
contained in the mortgage or deed of trust.
Id.
2. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(a) (West 1994). Section 726(a) reads in relevant
part: "There can be but one form of action for the recovery of any debt or the enforce-
ment of any right secured by mortgage upon real property .... which action shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter." Id.
3. See, e.g., Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 43-44, 378 P.2d 97, 102,
27 Cal. Rptr. 873, 877-78 (1963).
4. See, e.g., Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d 991, 997, 800 P.2d
557, 560, 275 Cal. Rptr 201, 204 (1990); see also infra part II.B.
5. See, e.g., Darren Conley, Comment, The Sanction for Violation of California's
One-Action Rule, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1601, 1608 (1991). See generally infra part lI.B; see
also ROGER BERNHARDT. CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST PRACTICE 187-
88 (2d ed. 1990).
6. In California, certain forms of debt secured by real property provide the lender
recourse against the borrower personally while other forms are treated in a manner simi-
lar to non-recourse debt regardless of the parties' desire for the lender to be able to
recover a deficiency judgment. A deficiency judgment is recovery of the excess of the
face value of the debt over the amount obtained from the sale of the property at foreclo-
sure. According to California Code of Civil Procedure section 580(b), a lender cannot
obtain a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure of real property that secures a purchase-
money loan. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 1994). See also BERNHARDT, supra
note 5, at 204. A purchase-money loan is defined as either (1) a loan in which the seller
provides the funds to the buyer, or (2) a loan provided by a third party with the money
being used to pay all or part of the purchase price of a dwelling of not more than four
units occupied entirely or in part by the purchaser. Id. Because a deficiency judgment is
not available under purchase-money loans, these loans are similar to non-recourse debt.
The intricacies of the rules governing purchase-money loans are beyond the scope of this
Note. Debt secured by real property, either partially or in total, that is not a purchase-
money loan is assumed to provide recourse against the borrower personally. This recourse
is limited by the patchwork of rules explored in this Note.
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available to California lenders. Examples of attempts to obtain col-
lateral in combination with real property that have been thwarted by
section 580(d) are guarantees,7 mortgage insurance,8 and now, let-
ters of credit.9 Courts continue to expand these debtor protection
statutes. During years of inflation and increasing property values,
these sections lay dormant. But in the midst of a stagnant economy
and falling property values the anti-deficiency policies awake from
their hibernation and receive extensive judicial attention.
A recent credit enhancement of choice is the "stdndby" letter of
credit. Its attraction lies in the perception that a letter of credit is
"as good as cash."'1 The use of letters of credit has expanded to the
point that, on December 31, 1992, the amount of "standby" letters
of credit issued by U.S. banks was $162.4 billion, of which $20.1
billion was issued by California banks." However, the recent Cali-
fornia appellate court decision in Western Security Bank v. Beverly
Hills Business Bank 2 calls into question the continued utility of let-
ters of credit as additional security when used in combination with
real property. The problems and questions created by the Western
Security Bank opinion are of such a significant nature that the Cali-
fornia Real Property Journal deemed Western Security Bank the
7. Union Bank v. Gradsky, 265 Cal. App. 2d 40, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1968).
8. Commonwealth Mortgage Assurance Co. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d
508, 259 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1989).
9. Western Sec. Bank v. Beverly Hills Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 25
Cal. Rptr. 2d 908 (1993), review granted, 871 P.2d 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 (1994).
10. See Amicus Brief for the California Banker's Association at 6, Western Sec.
Bank v. Beverly Hills Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908
(1993), review granted, 871 P.2d 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 (1994) (No. S037504) (pre-
pared for the California Supreme Court urging review of Western Security Bank) [here-
inafter CBA Brief]:
The letter of credit is an extremely important tool of domestic and interna-
tional commerce. Its unique attributes of speed, certainty of payment, effi-
ciency, precision and cost effectiveness facilitate hundreds of billions of dollars
of commerce annually that, in the absence of letters of credit, otherwise would
not occur or would occur only with increased expense and risk to the parties.
This important role as a facilitator of commerce is made possible by the special
rules of letter of credit law.
Id. at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
11. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Statistics on Banking (June 1993).
See also Peter J. Gregora, Letters of Credit in Real Property Finance Transactions, CAL.
REAL PROP. J., Spring 1991, at 1, 1, which states, "There are no readily available statis-
tics indicating the extent to which letters of credit are used in real estate transactions,
but anecdotal evidence and personal experience indicate that the use of letters of credit
has become quite common in real estate [financing]." Id. (emphasis added).
12. 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908 (1993), review granted, 871 P.2d
203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 (1994).
1993 case with the largest impact on California real property law.13
In part I, this Note examines how letters of credit are currently
used in real estate financing. Part II discusses the mechanics of sec-
tions 580(d) and 726(a) and how these statutes interact to limit
lender recourse. Part III discusses the Western Security Bank opin-
ion and its effect on the general letter of credit doctrine. Part IV
considers whether the interpretation that the Western Security Bank
court gave to the rules relating to standby letters of credit signifi-
cantly undermines the usefulness of such letters in real estate financ-
ing and concludes that it does. Part V considers possible judicial and
legislative solutions to the problems posed by Western Security
Bank, determines that the Legislature is the most likely source for a
reevaluation of the rules articulated in Western Security Bank, and
proposes legislation exempting letters of credit from the anti-defi-
ciency statutes. Part VI is a brief conclusion.
I. THE USE OF STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT IN REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS
To completely understand the implications of the Western Secur-
ity Bank decision, it is helpful to first explore the manner in which
letters of credit are currently used in financing real estate transac-
tions. In such a transaction, a letter of credit is typically used as a
readily accessible source of payment of a portion of the debt in addi-
tion to the security of the real property underlying a deed of trust. 4
The basic letter of credit relationship involves three different parties
and three contractual relationships. The three parties are referred to
as the customer or borrower (the party obligated to reimburse the
issuer if the letter of credit is drawn upon), the beneficiary or lender
(the party with the right to draw on the letter of credit), and the
issuer (typically a bank who issues the letter of credit). The contrac-
tual relationships can be called: (1) the reimbursement contract (ob-
ligating the customer/borrower to the issuer), (2) the letter of credit
contract (obligating the issuer to the beneficiary/lender), and (3) the
13. Barry P. Jablon, The "Top Ten," CAL. REAL PROP. J., Winter 1994, at 11, 11.
14. Letters of credit can be used in a variety of ways. For the sake of simplicity
and to facilitate an understanding of how the most common type of letter of credit rela-
tionships will be affected by Western Security Bank, this Note is limited to the most
basic manner in which letter of credit relationships are structured in real estate transac-
tions. This is by no means the sole manner in which letters of credit are used as security
by real estate lenders. In addition, this Note only discusses the manner in which letters of
credit are used in the real estate contei t and does not explicitly consider the use of letters
of credit in commercial sales transactions. For consideration of the various uses of letters
of credit, see generally JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL
AND STANDBY CREDITS % 1.10 (1984); BROOKE WUNNICKE & DIANE B. WUNNICKE,
STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT §§ 2.2, 2.3, 2.8 (1989).
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financing contract (obligating the customer/borrower to the benefi-
ciary/lender).15 Although these relationships are necessarily interre-
lated, the value of a letter of credit is derived from treating these
three contracts, and their underlying obligations, as completely inde-
pendent."6 This treatment is referred to as the "independence princi-
ple"17 and is vital to the value of letters of credit as security
enhancement devices.
In the real estate context, a letter of credit relationship is formed
when a borrower approaches the issuer, typically a bank, and re-
quests that the issuer promise to pay a certain amount to the lender
in the event the lender presents documents stating that the borrower
is in default. The issuer then requires the borrower to promise to
reimburse the issuer if it pays on the letter of credit. This promise is
the basis of the reimbursement contract. The-reason for the creation
of the letter of credit relationship is the underlying financing trans-
action. The beneficiary has a right to draw on the letter of credit
only if it presents the issuer with a document stating the borrower is
in default on this financing agreement. The issuer's obligation to pay
is not triggered by the borrower's actual default, but merely by the
lender's written representation of the default.18 Because the enforce-
ment of the issuer's obligation does not depend upon the underlying
financing transaction, these obligations are considered "independent"
of one another. The independence of these transactions shifts risk
from the lender to the issuer of the letter of credit and the
borrower."9
The distinct nature of the letter of credit obligations has resulted
in the cardinal rule of letter of credit law: the independence princi-
ple. Many of the advantages letters of credit have over other credit
devices emanate directly from this doctrine. As a result, uncertainty
surrounding what this doctrine requires undermines the usefulness of
letters of credit.
The independence principle obligates the issuing bank to review
only the documents presented for facial compliance.2 0 The bank is
15. Gregora, supra note 11, at 2.
16. Id. at 2, 3.
17. Id. at 3.
18. The written representation by the beneficiary must strictly conform to the re-
quirements specified in the letter of credit contract. See, e.g., Paramount Export Co. v.
Asia Trust Bank, Ltd., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1474, 1480, 238 Cal. Rptr. 920, 924 (1987)
("Documents nearly the same as those required are not good enough.").
19. Gregora, supra note 11, at 2.
20. See Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Baltimore County, 309 Md. 668,
526 A.2d 591 (1987); Gerald T. McLaughlin, Standby Letters of Credit and Guaranties:
not required to investigate the facts that underlie these documents.
Accordingly, the issuing bank's promise to pay on receipt of these
documents is not contingent on the truth or falsity of the facts stated
in the documents, which ensures that the lender will receive prompt
payment. This guarantee of prompt payment regardless of disputes
in the underlying contract has resulted in letters of credit being com-
monly considered "as good as cash."21 The certainty of letter of
credit payments eliminates significant risks a lender would otherwise
assume.
The independence principle encourages lenders to loan money sup-
ported by a letter of credit because it reduces the two central risks a
lender normally faces. 22 The first is the borrower's inability to repay
the underlying debt. The issuer has essentially added its credit to
that of the borrower. Because the issuer is generally a bank, the risk
of the issuer's insolvency is slight; the financial consequences of a
borrower's default will now be borne by the issuer to the extent of
the letter of credit amount. Upon payment to the lender under the
letter of credit, the issuer will typically have a right to reimburse-
ment from the borrower. However, in many cases this reimburse-
ment right (especially if unsecured) will be of little solace to the
issuer because the borrower's inability to repay the lender usually
indicates a similar inability to satisfy reimbursement obligations.23
The second risk shifted away from the lender is the loss of use of
the letter of credit funds during a dispute concerning the underlying
financing transaction.24 One commentator describes this reduction in
the lender's risk in the following way: "[T]he beneficiary is entitled
to payment from the issuer under the letter of credit even though the
customer [borrower] vigorously (and perhaps correctly) contends
that the beneficiary has no right to payment under the underlying
contract. 25 The practical significance is that the lender will have
this money during the time in which the underlying contract is dis-
puted. Thus, any delay in the resolution of the dispute will in no way
hinder the lender's financial position.
Letters of credit have become increasingly popular due to the
guaranteed payment mechanism created by the independence princi-
ple and the resulting diminishing of the lender's risk. Bending the
strict rules embodied in the independence principle will impair this
An Exercise in Cartography, 34 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1139, 1142-43 (1993); Gregora,
supra note 11, at 4.
21. See supra note 10.
22. See Michael Stern, The Independence Rule in Standby Letters of Credit, 52
U. Cm. L. REV. 218, 222 (1985); Gregora, supra note 11, at 2-3.
23. Of course this would not be the case if a borrower defaulted for reasons other
than financial infirmities.
24. Gregora, supra note 11, at 3.
25. Id.
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risk shifting mechanism and severely lessen the utility of letters of
credit as financing devices. The danger of a breakdown in the inde-
pendent treatment of letter of credit obligations is especially acute
when the independence principle collides with strong public policies,
such as those embodied in California's anti-deficiency legislation.
II. CALIFORNIA'S ANTI-DEFICIENCY LEGISLATION
California's anti-deficiency scheme is a product of the Great De-
pression and the legislative distaste for foreclosures and forfeitures
that occurred during that era for reasons beyond the debtors' con-
trol."6 John R. Hetland and Charles A. Hansen aptly describe the
development and motivation behind this legislation: "The [legislature
had in mind the] unsavory visage of the mustachioed mortgagee in a
top hat, ready to foreclose the family homestead, . . . resulting in a
system that is generously hedged about with debtor protections and
potential pitfalls for the unwary secured creditor."2 Two protections
created by this Depression Era legislation are sections 580(d) and
726(a).
A. Section 580(d): No Deficiency Judgment After a Nonjudicial
Foreclosure
California Code of Civil Procedure section 580(d) provides that a
deficiency judgment cannot be obtained on a note secured by real
property after a trustee's nonjudicial foreclosure.28 This provision
26. Western Sec. Bank v. Beverly Hills Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441,
1453-54, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 920 (1993), review granted, 871 P.2d 203, 29 Cal. Rptr.
2d 151 (1994) (quoting John R. Hetland & Charles A. Hansen, The "Mixed Collateral"
Amendments to California's Commercial Code - Covert Repeal of California's Real
Property Foreclosure and Antideficiency Provisions or Exercise in Futility?, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 185, 187-88 (1987)).
27. Hetland & Hansen, supra note 26, at 188-89. A footnote accompanying this
text in the Hetland & Hansen article provides an-enlightening view of the explicit favor-
itism provided borrowers over lenders by the California courts:
[The court] in Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951),
arguably California's most influential antiforfeiture decision[,] . . . referred to
the creditor (a land contract vendor) as ... [the villain] whom the law (char-
acterized as a disinterested "Pontius Pilate") would allow to keep his "pound
of flesh if he can carve it for himself." Id. at 21, 230 P.2d at 632 (quoting from
Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 MINN. L. REV. 329, 341
(1921)). Although the Freedman court does not use the name, the Ballantine
article calls the creditor "Shylock," id. at 347, and the Freedman court's refer-
ence, to a "pound of flesh" echoes this allusion.
Hetland & Hansen, supra note 26, at 188-89 n.17.
28. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West 1994). See generally BERNHARDT,
781
was enacted in 1940 to place nonjudicial foreclosure on a parity with
judicial foreclosure."' In Western Security Bank, the court accu-
rately describes the differences between judicial and nonjudicial
foreclosure:
In a judicial foreclosure, the beneficiary or trustee ... [obtains a judgment
directing] the sale of the property and application of the proceeds of sale to
the amount due on the debt . . . [T]he judgment may also contain a provi-
sion for allowance of deficiency and proceedings to determine the amount of
deficiency . . . .Because judicial foreclosure permits recovery of a defi-
ciency, the property must be sold subject to the debtor's right of
redemption.
In a nonjudicial foreclosure, the trustee exercises the power of sale given
him or her by the deed of trust ....
[T]he nonjudicial foreclosure is less expensive and more quickly con-
cluded than a judicial foreclosure and the debtor has no right of
redemption.30
Section 580(d) seeks to equalize judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure
by focusing on the tradeoff between the borrower retaining his statu-
tory redemption rights3' and the lender obtaining a deficiency judg-
ment. If the lender desires a deficiency judgment, she must institute
a judicial foreclosure and the sale will be subject to statutory re-
demption rights. If she wishes an expedited sale resulting in non-
redeemable title, section 580(d) will eliminate her right to a defi-
ciency judgment.3 2 Section 580(d) is complemented by section
726(a) - the one-action rule.
B. Section 726(a): The One-Action Rule and Security-First
Corollary
The one-action rule of section 726(a) is motivated by the legisla-
tive desire for creditors to proceed against all of a borrower's debt
first and in a single action. In Security National Bank v. Wozab,3 3
the California Supreme Court held that an "action" for section
726(a) purposes means a "proceeding in a court of justice. '3 4 The
supra note 5, at 197-203.
29. Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 44, 378 P.2d 97, 102, 27 Cal,
Rptr. 873, 878 (1963).
30. Western Sec. Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 1454-55, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 914
(footnotes omitted).
31. In California, a borrower is provided a redemption period after judicial foreclo-
sure during which time the borrower can regain title by repurchasing the property at the
price for which it was sold during the judicial sale. The time the borrower is allowed to
redeem depends upon whether the proceeds from the sale were greater or less than the
secured indebtedness. If the sales proceeds satisfied the entire indebtedness, the borrower
is allowed three months to redeem the property. Where the sales proceeds are less than
the indebtedness, and therefore the borrower is subject to a deficiency judgment, the
borrower is allowed one year to redeem. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 729.030 (West 1994).
32. Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 43-44, 378 P.2d at 102, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
33. 51 Cal. 3d 991, 800 P.2d 557, 275 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1990).
34. Id. at 998, 800 P.2d at 561, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 205. This "proceeding in a court
of justice" language is taken directly from California Code of Civil Procedure section 22.
782
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one-action rule would be severely limited if this were the only situa-
tion in which pre-foreclosure recourse triggered anti-deficiency pro-
tections. Acknowledging the undesirability of so limiting the one-
action rule, Wozab recognized the California judiciary has developed
a security-first corollary35 that does not include the "action" require-
ment.36 Roger Bernhardt provides the following summary of why the
security-first requirement is a necessary expansion of the one-action
rule:
Because [section 726(a)] bars an independent action on the note, the only
method by which a [lender] may recover from a [borrower's] personal es-
tate is by a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure sale has failed to pro-
duce enough to satisfy the debt. Thus, [section 726(a)] is a security-first
rule as well as a one-action rule ....
This security-first principle has the further effect of converting the
debtor's promise to pay from an absolute to a conditional obligation. A Cal-
ifornia [borrower] who signs a note does not promise unconditionally to
pay the note, but rather promises to pay any deficiency that remains if a
sale of the encumbered property does not satisfy the note.3
7
Stated simply, a creditor must first bring an action on, and ex-
haust all of the mortgaged security for, a debt before recovering
from the debtor personally. If the creditor does not follow this proce-
dure and the borrower raises an objection, the court will compel the
creditor to seek recourse from the mortgaged security before seeking
a personal deficiency judgment.38 If the borrower does not raise an
objection the lender will lose his security, but be entitled to retain
the proceeds from the improper action.39
By requiring lenders to proceed against all of a borrower's real
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 22 (West 1994).
35. The reference to the security-first requirement as a corollary to the one-action
rule is borrowed from Darren Conley's Comment analyzing the sanction aspect of section
726(a). See Conley, supra note 5, at 1608.
36. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 998-99, 800 P.2d at 561, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
37. BERNHARDT, supra note 5, at 187-88 (emphasis added).
38. Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 734, 518 P.2d 329, 332, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 897, 900 (1974). In the context of an informal "action," i.e., a banker's setoff, the
borrower will not be able to raise an affirmative defense because this is not a "proceeding
in a court of justice." Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 998, 800 P.2d at 561, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 205;
see also Conley, supra note 5, at 1615. However, the borrower can object to an informal
"action" instituted prior to foreclosing on the real property security and if the lender
does not return the proceeds it will be precluded from further foreclosure on the real
property security interest and will also lose the right to collect the remainder of the
debt. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 1006, 800 P.2d at 566, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
39. See Hetland & Hansen, supra note 26, at 206 n.78; Conley, supra note 5, at
1603.
property first and in one action, section 726(a) ensures that the bor-
rower will not be subject to multiple actions, and that the real prop-
erty security will be the primary source for satisfaction of the
borrower's obligation.40 Section 726(a) also prevents a lender from
skirting the limits of section 580(d) by obtaining a deficiency judg-
ment prior to a nonjudicial foreclosure.41 Importantly, these policies
seek to uphold the parties' expectations that the security will be
looked to first to satisfy the debt and the borrower will not be sub-
jected to multiple actions. The full effect of sections 726(a) and
580(d) can be illustrated by considering how they interact with one
another.
C. The Interaction of Sections 580(d) and 726(a): Lender's
Disappearing Options
To better understand how sections 580(d) and 726(a) complement
one another, consider the following hypothetical. A small local bank
lends a commercial borrower $5,000,000 to purchase and develop a
shopping center in an upscale neighborhood. The bank takes back a
note secured by a deed of trust on the shopping center. Everything is
going well (the tanning booth shop and hair care products store have
moved in) until the local country club closes down after the back
nine is designated a wildlife preserve by the state and thus con-
demned. The politically proper well-to-do country club members and
neighbors of the shopping center are all for nature so they do not
wield their substantial political power to save their country club. In-
stead, they find a country club in a different part of town, with its
own shopping center, and move.
In the above situation, the borrower may go into default and the
bank will contemplate how to recover the debt owed. Assume the
bank discovers that the borrower has $250,000 sitting in one of the
bank's demand deposit accounts. The bank will probably consider
three possibilities: (1) institute judicial foreclosure proceedings to
recover the entire debt, (2) foreclose on the deed of trust and begin
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, or (3) setoff the borrower's de-
mand deposit account and then institute either a nonjudicial or judi-
cial foreclosure.
If the bank chooses judicial foreclosure it will be able to obtain not
only the amount for which the shopping center is sold, but a defi-
ciency judgment against the borrower in the amount the debt ex-
ceeds the proceeds of the foreclosure sale.42 Although judicial
40. Walker, 10 Cal. 3d at 735, 518 P.2d at 333, Ill Cal. Rptr. at 901.
41. See, e.g., John R. Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California -
A New Judicial Approach, 51 CAL. L. REv. 1, 35 n.158 (1963).
42. Due to section 580(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, the amount of
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foreclosure may seem like the perfect solution to the bank's
problems, the bank could encounter several difficulties. For example,
the borrower may have other real estate investments that are deteri-
orating. In other words, the bank may realize time is of the essence;
a deficiency judgment will mean little if the borrower has nothing to
recover against. Because judicial foreclosure is slow and costly,
resorting to judicial foreclosure in this situation will probably leave
the bank with a deficiency judgment against a borrower who is judg-
ment-proof.
The bank's next option is nonjudicial foreclosure. Nonjudicial
foreclosure does not suffer from the turtle syndrome encountered in
judicial foreclosure. It can be done quickly and probably concluded
before the borrower's funds are depleted. But expediency has a price.
Due to the limitations of section 580(d), a deficiency judgment can-
not be obtained after a nonjudicial foreclosure. Consequently, the
bank's recovery will be limited to the proceeds from the sale of a
shopping center adjacent to a wildlife preserve. It would not be sur-
prising, especially in the current California real estate market, to
discover the bank will be the only party willing to purchase the prop-
erty. Thus, the bank will be facing the possibility of obtaining this
wildlife shopping center in exchange for the borrower's $5,000,000
loan.
Finally, the bank could setoff the $250,000 that the borrower has
in one of their demand deposit accounts. But once again, this will
create problems for the bank. Due to the rule articulated in Wozab,
if the bank decides to take this course of action, the borrower will
have a choice of responses. If the borrower demands the return of
the funds, the bank can either comply and be forced to proceed
the deficiency will be further limited to the excess, if any, of either the amount of the
shopping center proceeds or the fair market value of the center at the time of the sale,
whichever is greater, over the face value of the debt. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(a)
(West 1994). Section 580(a), in conjunction with section 726(b),
require[s] that any deficiency judgment must be based upon proceedings com-
menced within three months after the foreclosure sale and be computed on the
basis of the fair market value of the secured property at the time of the sale; in
other words, any deficiency must be promptly sought and be limited to the
difference between the amount of the foreclosure judgment and the fair value
of the security.
Western Sec. Bank v. Beverly Hills Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1454 n.4, 25
Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 913 n.4 (1993), review granted, 871 P.2d 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151
(1994) (citing Citrus State Bank v. McKendrick, 215 Cal. App. 3d 941, 263 Cal. Rptr.
781 (1989); Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 425 (1985); Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood, Ltd., 163 Cal. App. 3d 359, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 294 (1985)).
against the shopping center first, or refuse and lose not only the
shopping center security, but also the right to pursue the balance of
the underlying debt.4 3 If the borrower does not demand the return of
the funds the bank will have lost its real property security."
In light of its predicament, the bank's ultimate course of action
will probably be determined by whether the wildlife shopping center
is now worth more than $250,000. The bank will be left with either
(1) the $250,000 proceeds in the demand deposit account,45 (2) the
wildlife shopping center, 46 or (3) the wildlife shopping center and a
deficiency judgment which may be worthless.4
This hypothetical simply illustrates what was stated earlier: "A
California ... [borrower] who signs a note does not promise un-
conditionally to pay the note, but rather promises any deficiency
that remains if a sale of the encumbered property does not satisfy
the note."4 This general rule should be expanded to include the re-
quirement that this deficiency can only be obtained if the sale of the
property is completed through judicial foreclosure. As considered
above, when time is of the essence these rules may effectively pre-
clude the lender from obtaining any deficiency at all.
In Western Security Bank, the court encountered a direct conflict
between the anti-deficiency provisions and the independence princi-
ple of letter of credit law discussed in part I. The result, although
not surprising, will have dramatic implications upon the manner in
which real estate financing is practiced and, more importantly, upon
the availability of such financing.
III. WESTERN SECURITY BANK V. BEVERLY HILLS BUSINESS
BANK: A CASE OF FORCED JUDICIAL MISDIRECTION
A. Facts and Procedural History
On October 10, 1984, Beverly Hills Business Bank (Bank) loaned
$3,250,000 to Vista Place Associates (Vista), a limited partnership,
43. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
44. See Walker, 10 Cal. 3d at 733-34, 518 P.2d at 520-21, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 899-
900; Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 38-39, 378 P.2d 97, 98-99, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 873, 874-75 (1963).
45. If the improper bank setoff is used and the bank refuses to return the funds
when the borrower demands that they do so, the right to collect the remainder of the
debt, and consequently to proceed against the security, will be lost. See supra notes 38-
40 and accompanying text.
46. If nonjudicial foreclosure is used a deficiency judgment will be prevented by
section 580(d). See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
47. If judicial foreclosure is used the lender can obtain a deficiency judgment. But
note the problems associated with judicial foreclosure discussed supra notes 31-32 and
accompanying text.
48. BERNHARDT, supra note 5, at 187-88 (emphasis added).
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to finance the purchase of a shopping center. Vista's three general
partners (the Vista partners) all signed a promissory note and the
loan was secured by a "Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents."49
Due to financial difficulties, Vista defaulted on the loan. On Feb-
ruary 1, 1987, the Bank and Vista entered into a loan modification
agreement that enabled Vista to continue to operate the shopping
center and repay the debt. Under the terms of this modification
agreement the three Vista partners each obtained an unconditional,
irrevocable standby letter of credit issued by Western Security Bank
(Western) in favor of the Bank in the amount of $125,000, for a
total of $375,000. The modification agreement documented the un-
derlying financial transaction and also provided that the Bank was
entitled to use the letters of credit if Vista defaulted again or the
loan was not fully paid at maturity.
50
In December 1990, the Bank declared Vista to be in default on
the modified loan. The Bank began nonjudicial foreclosure proceed-
ings. The Bank then filed an action against Vista seeking specific
performance of the rents and profits provisions of the deed of trust as
well as appointment of a receiver.5 1 On June 11, 1991, the Bank and
Vista's attorneys entered into a letter agreement in settlement of the
specific performance lawsuit. This agreement provided in pertinent
part:
[Vista will] not take any legal action to prevent [Bank's] drawing upon [the
letters of credit] after the Trustee's sale of the Vista Place Shopping Center
• ..provided that the amount of the draw by [Bank] does not exceed an
amount equal to the difference between [Vista's] indebtedness and the suc-
cessful bid of the Trustee's Sale.62
Vista further agreed that after the Bank drew on the letters of
credit, it would not take any legal action against the Bank with re-
spect to the draw.
On June 13, 1991, the Bank concluded its nonjudicial foreclosure
on the shopping center. The Bank was the only bidder and purchased
49. Western Sec. Bank v. Beverly Hills Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441,
1449, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 910-11 (1993), review granted, 871 P.2d 203, 29 Cal. Rptr.
2d 151 (1994).
50. Id. at 1450, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911. The Vista partners each promised to
reimburse Western if the letters were ever drawn upon. Separate promissory notes of
$125,000 were given to Western by each of the Vista partners to secure the reimburse-
ment agreement. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (alteration in original).
the property for $2,744,109.84, leaving a $505,890.16 unpaid defi-
ciency on the entire debt of $3,250,000. 53 The Bank then delivered
the three letters of credit to Western and demanded payment of
$375,000. That same day, Vista's attorney provided Western with
written notice that any attempt by Western to seek reimbursement
from the Vista partners would be barred by section 580(d). Finding
itself in the middle of competing claims with respect to the letters of
credit, Western refused to honor the Bank's demand for payment
and sought declaratory relief in the form of (1) a declaration that it
was not obligated to accept or honor the Bank's tender of the letters
of credit, or alternatively, (2) a declaration that, if it was required to
honor the letters, the Vista partners were obligated to reimburse
Western despite section 580(d).54
The trial court held that the Bank was entitled to recover from
Western the sum of $375,000, plus interest, and that Western was
not barred from seeking reimbursement from the Vista partners.
Western filed an appeal from this judgment and the Vista partners
filed a cross appeal. 5
B. The Appellate Court's Decision
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the draw upon the let-
ters of credit after the nonjudicial foreclosure was a violation of sec-
tion 580(d) because this draw was the equivalent of a deficiency
judgment.56 It then attempted a precarious balancing of the indepen-
dence principle and the policies upon which section 580(d) is based.
The court decided the best way to reconcile these two provisions was
to treat the Bank's draw upon the letters of credit after a nonjudicial
foreclosure as "fraud in the transaction" under California Commer-
cial Code section 5114(2)(b),57 thus fitting it into an exception to the
independence principle. As a result, the court allowed Western to
either honor the transaction and seek reimbursement from the Vista
partners or refuse to honor the letters of credit. 8 If Western honored
the letters of credit and obtained reimbursement, the Vista partners
could recover from the Bank the amount the Vista partners reim-
bursed Western.59
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1451, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
55. Id., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911-12.
56. Id. at 1465, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921.
57. Id. California Commercial Code section 5114(2)(b) reads in pertinent part:
"[A]n issuer acting in good faith may honor the draft or demand for payment despite
notification from the customer of fraud, forgery, or other defect not apparent on the face
of the documents." CAL. COM. CODE § 5114(2)(b) (West 1994) (emphasis added).
58. Western Sec. Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 1465, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921-22.
59. Id. at 1465 n.15, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921-22 n.15. "[I]t seems clear that had
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C. The Damage Western Security Bank Inflicts Upon Letter of
Credit Law
The Western Security Bank decision threatens the vitality of the
independence principle by significantly expanding the "fraud in the
transaction" exception. This unjustified expansion resulted from the
court (1) relying upon precedent that is no longer viewed as the
proper interpretation of "fraud in the transaction," (2) ignoring the
existing body of law interpreting California as adhering to a narrow
reading of "fraud in the transaction" and closely guarding the sanc-
tity of the independence principle, (3) incorrectly determining that
interpreting "fraud in the transaction" as "fraud in the credit trans-
action" would create a "meaningless redundancy"60 in the California
Commercial Code, and (4) inaccurately characterizing the Bank's
conduct as fraudulent.
In Western Security Bank, the only case the court cites in support
of its expansive interpretation of "fraud in the transaction" is Sztejn
v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp.61 To the court's credit, Sztejn is
considered the origin of the "fraud in the transaction" exception. In
Sztejn, the beneficiary of a letter of credit was to draw upon it once
he tendered invoices demonstrating shipment of fifty crates of bris-
tles. Instead, the beneficiary sent fifty crates of garbage. The court
allowed the letter of credit customer to enjoin the beneficiary from
drawing upon the letter of credit.6 2 This holding, if it were still fol-
lowed by courts to the letter, does lend credence to Western Security
Bank's expansive reading of "fraud in the transaction." However, in
relying upon Sztejn as the modern definition of "fraud in the trans-
action," the court ignored over fifty years of precedent that has sys-
tematically limited Sztejn to its facts.
Today, contrary to the Western Security Bank's representations,
Sztejn is viewed as an extreme definition of "fraud in the transac-
tion." For this reason it is rarely followed. One commentator accu-
rately describes the subsequent judicial treatment and the problems
with the Sztejn view in the following way:
Western chosen to honor the Bank's demand, the Vista defendants would have no re-
course against Western and would be liable on their reimbursement notes; their remedy
would have been limited to an appropriate action against the bank." Id. (emphasis
added).
60. Id. at 1464 n.14, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921 n.14.
61. 177 Misc. 719, 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634-35 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
62. Id. at 721-22, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633-35.
Commentators have generally sought to limit Sztejn to fraudulent docu-
mentary compliance (as opposed to [fraud in the underlying sales con-
tract]). A broad reading of Sztejn would certainly jeopardize the principle
that the documents and not the . . . [underlying sales contract] are all a
bank must review, a principle indispensable to the continued utility of the
letter of credit.3
The court's reliance upon a fifty-year-old holding that represents the
minority view is even more disturbing because there is an active in-
terpretation of California law that the court failed to recognize. The
closest the court comes to considering this precedent is in footnote 14
when it refers in passing to Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Bank
of San Francisco.4 The court describes Bank of San Francisco as
an example of "some authority to the contrary" of its interpretation
of "fraud in the transaction. 65 In light of the detrimental impact
created by the court's expansion of this exception, it is appropriate to
consider the "authority to the contrary" the court elected to ignore.
The first in a series of federal cases to consider the "fraud in the
transaction" exception under California law was Agnew v. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp.66 Agnew interpreted California law to be
more restrictive regarding the enjoining of an issuer's payments than
even the Uniform Commercial Code:
The California legislature could not have spoken more clearly. The com-
mercial viability of letters of credit depends on their ability to provide as-
surance of payment. Consequently, to enjoin the issuing banks from paying
the letters of credit would directly contradict the intent of the legislature
and erode the certainty that should accompany letter of credit
transactions.
6 7
Five years later, in Bank of San Francisco,68 mentioned above, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted "fraud in the transaction" under Califor-
nia law, and relying heavily upon Agnew, came to the same conclu-
sion regarding its meaning. Bank of San Francisco brought the
federal interpretation of the California "fraud in the transaction"
exception into clear focus when it explained why in that case the
issuer's refusal to honor the letter of credit was improper: "For the
[issuer] to prevail . . . the terms 'fraud in the transaction' must
mean 'fraud in the underlying transaction.' . . . Such an interpreta-
tion undermines the institution of letters of credit; it invites uncer-
tainty and litigation in the place of assured payment." 9
63. Paul R. Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 STAN. L.
REV. 716, 720 n.23 (1973) (emphasis added).
64. 817 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1987).
65. Western Sec. Bank v. Beverly Hills Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441,
1464 n.14, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 921 n.14 (1993), review granted, 871 P.2d 203, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 151 (1994).
66. 548 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
67. Id. at 1238 (citations omitted).
68. 817 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 1399.
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The final act of this trilogy was Trans Meridian Trading, Inc. v.
Empresa Nacional de Commercializacion (hereinafter TMTI).70 In
TMTI, the Ninth Circuit again relied heavily upon Agnew in hold-
ing that an issuer could not be enjoined from honoring a letter of
credit simply by virtue of a dispute in the underlying transaction.
Admittedly, Bank of San Francisco is the only case of the three
that explicitly dealt with the degree of fraud in the transaction nec-
essary to allow the issuer to refuse to honor a letter. Both Agnew
and TMTI evaluated the fraud necessary to allow a borrower to en-
join an issuer from payment. Nonetheless, this line of cases is best
viewed as indicating that, contrary to the characterization of the
Western Security Bank court, California law provides a narrow in-
terpretation of "fraud in the transaction" and a robust existence of
the independence principle. Even assuming an overly narrow reading
of Agnew and TMTI that might allow them to be distinguished en-
tirely, the lucid teachings of Bank of San Francisco cannot be ig-
nored: "[Interpreting 'fraud in the transaction' to mean 'fraud in the
underlying transaction'] undermines the institution of letters of
credit; it invites uncertainty and litigation in the place of assured
payment. 72
California courts are committed to a strict adherence to the inde-
pendence principle. This is exemplified by Lumbermans Acceptance
Co. v. Security Pacific National Bank,73 the only California case to
previously address this issue. The Lumbermans court stressed the
importance of the independence principle: "An issuer 'must honor a
draft or demand for payment which complies with the terms of the
relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents com-
ply to the underlying contract for sale ...between the customer
and the beneficiary."' 4 Because Lumbermans does not explicitly in-
terpret "fraud in the transaction," the Western Security Bank court
limited its use to illustrating that letters of credit embody the inde-
pendence principle and thus can be distinguished from guarantees
and sureties.
75
70. 829 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1987).
71. Id. at 955.
72. Bank of San Francisco, 817 F.2d at 1399.
73. 86 Cal. App. 3d 175, 150 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1978).
74. Id. at 178, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 71 (quoting CAL. COM. CODE § 5114(1); Asocia-
cion De Azucareros De Guatemala v. United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 423 F.2d
638, 641 (9th Cir. 1970))(emphasis added).
75. Western Sec. Bank v. Beverly Hills Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 1441, 1459-
60, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 918 (1993), review granted, 871 P.2d 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d
151 (1994).
By utilizing Lumbermans in such a limited way, the court entirely
misses the point. The independence principle requires that the under-
lying transaction be completely separate from the letter of credit
transaction. The court's reading of "fraud in the transaction" as
"fraud in the underlying transaction" necessarily allows the status of
the underlying transaction to creep in to the issuer's decision upon
whether to honor a draw upon a letter of credit. Therefore, in con-
trast to the court's treatment of its holding as consistent with Lum-
bermans, the Western Security Bank interpretation of "fraud in the
transaction" is irreconcilable with the Lumbermans court's deference
to the independence principle.
The Western Security Bank court seemed to realize precedent was
not on their side. To counter this, the court resorted to some ques-
tionable interpretation tactics. It stated that interpreting "fraud in
the transaction" as "fraud in the credit transaction" creates a
"meaningless redundancy" in the California Commercial Code.7 6 In
footnote 14 of the Western Security Bank opinion, the court at-
tempted this misdirection:
The term "fraud in the transaction" includes a deception of the debtor.
While there is some authority to the contrary [citing Bank of San Fran-
cisco] we believe that this term applies to "fraud in the underlying transac-
tion" (i.e., fraud on the debtor). There is no California law on this point,
but we have no trouble concluding that if the term were limited to "fraud in
the credit transaction" (i.e., fraud on the issuer) it would be nothing more
than a meaningless redundancy. It is difficult to imagine a fraud on the
issuer that would not involve the use of a forged or fraudulent document;
however, these two possibilities are already expressly included in California
Uniform Commercial Code section 5114, subdivision (2). Thus, the final
phrase, "or there is fraud in the transaction," must have been added for
some other purpose [namely to include fraud in the underlying
transaction]."
The "redundancy" the court relies on is based upon the court's diffi-
culty in imagining "a fraud on the issuer that would not involve the
use of a forged or fraudulent document ....
The court's finding of a redundancy is flawed for two reasons. The
first problem with this interpretation is that it incorrectly equates
"fraud in the credit transaction" with "fraud on the issuer." "Fraud
in the credit transaction" covers not only cases where there is fraud
upon the issuer, but also where there is conduct that constitutes
fraud of a nature that vitiates the entire underlying transaction, re-
gardless of its effect upon the issuer. 79 One court describes these sit-
uations as being based upon "wrongdoing of the beneficiary [that]
76. Id. at 1464 n.14, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921 n.14.
77. Id. (third emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. See Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 361-62, 336
A.2d 316, 325-26 (1975) (requiring egregious fraud); Trans Meridian Trading, Inc. v.
Empresa Nacional de Comercializacion, 829 F.2d 949, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1987) (utilizing
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has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes of
the independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer be
served."8 0 In such cases, the beneficiary's fraud must consist of "out-
rageous conduct which shocks the conscience of the court."81 There-
fore, the egregiousness of the fraud is the determining factor, not
upon whom the fraud was perpetrated.
The second problem with the redundancy alleged by the Western
Security Bank court is "fraud in the credit transaction" is not lim-
ited to cases involving forged or fraudulent documents. Black's Law
Dictionary defines fraud as: "An intentional perversion of the truth
for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with
some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal
right."18 2 In the context of letters of credit, fraud is present not only
when there is fraudulent or forged documents, but in other situations
as well.
Examples where fraud in a letter of credit transaction would not
involve fraudulent or forged documents include when someone other
than the beneficiary attempts to draw on the letter of credit, or the
beneficiary enters into the letter of credit agreement while planning
at the time of its formation to later make an improper draw.8 3 A
fraudulent letter of credit transaction requires intentional misrepre-
sentations that induce the formation or payment of the letter of
credit. Courts also require egregious conduct - " 'active intentional
fraud' or 'evil intent'." '84 This requirement ensures that the "fraud in
the transaction" exception does not swallow the independence princi-
ple. Therefore, Western Security Bank is incorrect when it says that
it is difficult to imagine a situation where "fraud in the credit trans-
action" would not involve forged or fraudulent documents.
The Western Security Bank court incorrectly defines "fraud in the
transaction." But even under its unjustifiably expansive reading of
an active intentional fraud standard similar to Intraworld test); GATX Leasing Corp. v.
DBM Drilling Corp., 657 S.W.2d 178, 183 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (applying the In-
traworld test to a standby letter of credit); see generally William M. Hensley, Lenders
and Bankers Beware: Second District Uses Section 580d to Impale Letter of Credit
Draws and Enforces Unduly Broad View of "Fraud in the Transaction" Exception, CAL.
REAL EST. REP., Jan. 1994, at 7, 12.
80. Intraworld, 461 Pa. at 359, 336 A.2d at 324-25.
81. Edward L. Symons, Letters of Credit: Fraud, Good Faith and the Basis for
Injunctive Relief, 54 TUL. L. REV. 338, 348 (1980).
82. BLACK'S LAW DIC'TIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990).
83. See Stern, supra note 22, at 232.
84. Trans Meridian Trading, Inc. v. Empresa Nacional De Comercializacion, 829
F.2d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
the exception, the Bank's conduct did not establish the requisite
fraud. The court initially states that the fraudulent conduct is based
on what it terms the lender's "implicit representation that the letters
would not be presented for payment after a nonjudicial foreclo-
sure."85 The court reasoned that "[t]he Bank's subsequent conduct
in nonetheless presenting the letters following such a foreclosure ef-
fectively worked a fraud upon the Vista partners. ' 8 This indicates
that the "fraud in the transaction" was created by the Bank reneg-
ing upon its implicit representation not to present the letters of credit
for payment after a nonjudicial foreclosure. However, the court
continued:
The Bank's effort to recover payment on the standby letters after it had
concluded a nonjudicial foreclosure constituted the imposition of indirect
liability upon the Vista partners which clearly conflicts with the legislative
policy and purpose behind the enactment of section 580d. In our view such
conduct amounted to a "fraud in the transaction" within the meaning of
Commercial Code section 5114, subdivision (2).87
This assertion bases the "fraud in the transaction" upon the Bank's
imposition of indirect liability on the Vista partners after nonjudicial
foreclosure. The rationale seems to be that this violates the legisla-
tive policy behind section 580(d), amounting to a "fraud." The
court's argument leaves unanswered the question of what aspect of
the bank's conduct created this "fraud." Was it the breach of the
implied representation or violation of the legislative purpose behind
section 580(d)? If either of these two aspects of the Bank's conduct
constituted "fraud in the transaction" the court's decision was cor-
rect. However, both of the characteristics of the Bank's conduct
proffered by the court were insufficient to trigger this exception.
The court's creation of and reliance upon an implied promise by
the Bank not to draw on the letters after the nonjudicial foreclosure
was completely unjustified. The Bank attempted to guarantee that it
would be able to draw on the letters of credit in this manner by
obtaining a written assurance from the Vista partners that they
would not take legal action to enjoin the Bank from drawing after a
nonjudicial foreclosure."' In addition, the Vista partners promised
not to seek recourse from the Bank after the draw. Therefore, not
only did the Bank fail to represent it would not draw upon the letters
of credit after a nonjudicial foreclosure, it explicitly included provi-
sions to allow it to do so without being subject to legal sanctions.
The Vista partners agreed to these terms and thus could not have
85. Western Sec. Bank v. Beverly Hills Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441,
1464, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 921 (1993), review granted, 871 P.2d 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d
151 (1994).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1465, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921.
88. Id. at 1450, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
[VOL. 31: 775. 1994] Western Security Bank
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
reasonably believed the Bank was impliedly promising not to act in
this manner. Even assuming the court was justified in inferring this
representation, the Bank's later draw in no way approaches the "in-
tentional perversion of the truth" included in the traditional defini-
tion of fraud. 9
The court's assertion that violation of the legislative purpose be-
hind section 580(d) was sufficient to establish fraud barely merits
consideration. Fraud would have little independent meaning if its
scope included every violation of legislative policy and purpose. One
of the clearest rules of letter of credit law is that "fraud in the trans-
action" will not be triggered by a bona fide dispute concerning the
underlying transaction. As evidenced by the public reaction follow-
ing the Western Security Bank decision, 9 the Bank was not alone in
the belief that drawing on a letter of credit after a nonjudicial fore-
closure would not violate section 580(d). The court's decision that
the Bank's draw was in violation of section 580(d) in no way creates
an intent to deceive at the time of the draw by the Bank.92 There-
fore, violating section 580(d) was not sufficient to taint the transac-
tion with fraud, especially because the Bank had no knowledge that
its conduct would create this violation.
89. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990); see supra text accompany-
ing note 82.
90. See, e.g., Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 361, 336
A.2d 316, 325 (1975) (stating that an injunction is justified only if lender has no bona
fide claim to payment); Airline Reporting Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Holly Hill, 832
F.2d 823, 828 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that an injunction will be justified if the lender
has an active intent to defraud and there is no colorable basis for the underlying contract
for the lender to call the letter of credit); Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 730
F.2d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1984) (deciding that an injunction will only be granted if a lender's
claim for payment has absolutely no basis in fact).
91. See, e.g., Steven J. Cot6, Appellate Court Denies Lenders by Confirming Prior
Decision That Anti-Deficiency Rule Bars Draw Down of Letter of Credit Following
Nonjudicial Foreclosure, CAL. REAL EST. REP., Jan. 1994, at 1; Hensley, supra note 79;
Dennis B. Arnold, Credit Enhancement: An Elusive Illusion 8-22, Presentation to the
Finance Lawyers Conference and the Real Property Section of the Los Angeles County
Bar Association (November 4, 1993) (on file with author); Jablon, supra note 13, at 11
(choosing Western Security Bank as the 1993 case with the largest impact on California
real property law).
.92. See CBA Brief, supra note 10, at 12:
[Western Security Bank] leads to the inevitable conclusion that any alleged
violation of public policy in the underlying transaction would constitute a fraud
by the beneficiary even if prior law had never addressed the public policy issue.
The fraud exception has been construed so broadly by the Court of Appeals
that it devours the independence principle.
Id.
In sum, the Western Security Bank decision is an improper appli-
cation of "fraud in the transaction" as it exists under current law.
The court misapplied this doctrine by (1) relying on outdated prece-
dent, (2) ignoring current judicial interpretations, (3) incorrectly as-
serting that the "fraud in the credit transaction" view creates a
redundancy under the California Commercial Code, and (4) inaccu-
rately characterizing the Bank's conduct as fraudulent. Therefore,
Justice Kitching, dissenting in Western Security Bank, was correct
when she stated that "[the] Bank's presentation of the letter of
credit to .. . [the issuer] after a nonjudicial foreclosure [was not]
akin to a fraudulent act and [I] see no indication that is what the
legislature intended.""3 Unfortunately, the detrimental implications
Western Security Bank will have upon the use of letters of credit in
real estate financing is not limited to this doctrinal damage. If sec-
tion 726(a) limits are placed on pre-foreclosure draws, the utility of
letters of credit will be further undermined.
IV. THE VANISHING UTILITY OF LETTERS OF CREDIT IN REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: "GOOD AS CASH" BUT IN LIEU OF THE
REAL PROPERTY SECURITY
In Western Security Bank, the court was careful to skirt the ques-
tion of whether section 726(a) would apply to pre-foreclosure draws
on letters of credit. Relegating the issue to a footnote, the court rec-
ognized that:
The Bank was, of course, free to make a demand upon the defendants'
standby letters after the debt went into default but prior to the nonjudicial
foreclosure. Had it done so, there would be no conflict with section 580d. It
is the attempt to enforce the letters following the nonjudicial foreclosure
sale which presents the problem.
94
The court was suspiciously silent about whether this would be a vio-
lation of section 726(a), resulting in a loss of the lender's additional
security. The court also observed that "[r]eal property lenders who
rely on standby letters in the future will have to consider the alterna-
tives of judicial foreclosure or the making of pre-foreclosure de-
mands on the letters."95 Again, the court made no mention of section
726(a), but the court implicitly warned lenders to compare the alter-
natives of judicial foreclosure with pre-foreclosure demands before
taking action.9" The upshot seems to be that the court was not ready
93. Western Sec. Bank v. Beverly Hills Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441,
1470, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 925 (1993) (Kitching, J., dissenting), review granted, 871
P.2d 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 (1994).
94. Id. at 1463 n.1l, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920 n.11 (second emphasis added).
95. Id. at 1466, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 922.
96. In MDFC Loan Corp. v. Greenbrier Plaza Partners, 21 Cal. App. 4th 1045, 26
Cal. Rptr. 2d 596 (1994), a decision subsequent to Western Security Bank, the appellate
court again ignored the issue of whether a pre-foreclosure draw on a letter of credit
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to pass on this issue, but wanted lenders to be aware of the pitfalls
which logically follow from the Western Security Bank decision. In
light of the court's foreshadowing, the next section considers whether
section 726(a) applies to pre-foreclosure letter of credit draws.
A. Does Section 726(a) Apply to Pre-Foreclosure Draws?
As discussed previously, section 726(a) embodies a one-action rule
and a security-first corollary. Generally, the one-action rule only ap-
plies to judicial "actions. '97 Letter of credit draws clearly do not fit
into this category. However, Security Pacific National Bank v.
Wozab"8 held that an informal "action," in that case a bank setoff,
violates the security-first corollary to the one-action rule.9 Under
Wozab, a draw upon a letter of credit should also be an informal
"action" that violates the security-first corollary because it results in
a multiplicity of suits against the borrower. 100 In addition, allowing
violated section 726(a). Instead, citing Western Security Bank, the MDFC court simply
stated that "no conflict with Section 580d arises where a real property lender draws on a
letter of credit before nonjudicially foreclosing on the property." Id. at 1056 n.3, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 603 n.3 (citing Western Sec. Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 1463 n. 11, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 920 n.ll).
97. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
98. 51 Cal. 3d 991, 800 P.2d 557, 275 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1990).
99. Id. at 999, 800 P.2d at 562, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 206. For a general discussion of
Wozab and the security-first corollary, see supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
100. The Wozab court held that a banker's setoff was an informal "action" that
violated the security-first corollary to the one-action rule. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 999, 800
P.2d at 562, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 206. The sanction imposed was a loss of the bank's secur-
ity upon the note. Draws on letters of credit should not be treated any differently. Two
distinctions between a banker's setoff and a letter of credit draw that could be offered to
rationalize allowing a preforeclosure draw despite the Wozab decision are: (1) a draw
can be viewed as a proceeding against "security," a bank setoff cannot, and (2) a letter
of credit draw will require the borrower to meet his reimbursement obligation but this
will be a payment to the third party issuer, conversely, the bank's setoff is a direct collec-
tion by the lender. However, both of these distinctions were implicitly refuted by the
Western Security Bank opinion.
The first of the above distinctions is based upon the Western Security Bank court's
statement that the letter of credit was "security." Western Sec. Bank v. Beverly Hills
Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1452, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 910 (1993) (stating
that the letter of credit was given to the lender as additional security); Id. at 183, 25
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 923 (describing the letter of credit as "additional security for repay-
ment of the loan"). However, the court used the term "security" too loosely. If the court
was saying that the letter of credit was additional "security" for the purposes of the anti-
deficiency legislation, Western Security Bank would have been a case based on a section
726(a) violation, not a section 580(d) violation. The nonjudicial foreclosure would have
been an informal "action," thus triggering the security-first corollary and resulting in a
loss of the remainder of the security. See Conley, supra note 5, at 1608. The letter of
credit would have been the security lost if it were actually security under the anti-defi-
ciency legislation. Because Western Security Bank was decided under section 580(d), the
letters of credit to be drawn on prior to a nonjudicial foreclosure
would undermine the policy behind section 580(d) by giving the
lender the equivalent of a deficiency judgment prior to a nonjudicial
foreclosure.
One of the central policies embodied in section 726(a) is that bor-
rowers should not be subjected to a multiplicity of lawsuits. 1°1 When
a lender draws on a letter of credit the issuer will typically enforce
its reimbursement right against the borrower. In most real estate fi-
nancing situations, the letter of credit amount will only be for a por-
tion of the total debt. Consequently, after a pre-foreclosure draw, the
borrower will not only have the lender pursuing her for the amount
of the debt not obtained from drawing on the letter of credit, but will
also have the issuer pursuing her for reimbursement. As the Western
Security Bank court recognized, "It makes no difference to . . . [a
borrower's] purse whether the recovery is by the original creditor in
a direct action . . . or whether the recovery is in an action . . . for
reimbursement of the same sum."'01 2 Providing that pre-foreclosure
draws on letters of credit do not violate section 726(a) would permit
the lender to bring multiple actions against the borrower - precisely
what section 726(a) was enacted to avoid.
Additionally, in the context of nonjudicial foreclosures, it is essen-
tial to treat post-foreclosure and pre-foreclosure draws the same in
order to ensure the "strong public policies" Western Security Bank
recognized as underlying the antideficiency legislation are upheld. As
John R. Hetland puts it: "§ 580d . . . make[s] it clear that the
creditor would waive the balance of his security by . . [recovering
from the borrower prior to a nonjudicial judgment]. Otherwise, by
reversing the order, the creditor could get what 580d prohibits, a
court was treating the letter of credit not as security, but as a personal deficiency
judgment.
The second distinction was eviscerated by Western Security Bank because the court
treated the enforcement of the reimbursement obligation as equivalent to the lender's
proceeding against the security. As a result, it is of little consequence that a banker's
setoff is a direct collection from the borrower while a letter of credit draw (borrower pays
the letter of credit issuer and not the lender) is an indirect collection.
An interesting side note is that even if letters of credit could be viewed as additional
security, the result reached would be the same as that in Western Security Bank (loss of
the right to collect on the letter of credit) because section 726(a) requires not only that a
lender exhaust the security upon a note before seeking a deficiency judgment, but it also
requires that all of the security be proceeded against in one-action. If a letter of credit
being used in combination with real property is security, a proceeding against the letter
effectively exhausts the lender's one-action against security. Consequently, although the
lender has proceeded against "security-first," he has not proceeded against it in total and,
thus, will forfeit the amount that remains.
101. Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 735, 518 P.2d 329, 333, 111
Cal. Rptr. 897, 901 (1974).
102. Western Sec. Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 1456, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 915 (citing
Union Bank v. Gradsky, 265 Cal. App. 2d 40, 46, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64, 69 (1968)) (empha-
sis added).
[VOL. 31 775. 1994] Western Security Bank
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
personal judgment and extrajudicial sale of the security . . . ."103 If
a lender were allowed to make a draw before a nonjudicial foreclo-
sure without being subject to the imposition of the one-action/secur-
ity-first sanction, she would be receiving an advance nonjudicial
foreclosure deficiency judgment.104 From a policy perspective, there
is little substantive difference if a letter of credit draw is made
before or after a nonjudicial foreclosure. The result is the same -
the borrower has lost the real property security without the benefit of
a fair value hearing or the right of redemption. Since the issuer will
pursue the borrower for reimbursement, the borrower is effectively
forced to pay a pre-foreclosure deficiency to the issuer. Because
Western Security Bank treats a letter of credit draw as the
equivalent of a deficiency judgment, such a draw runs afoul of the
anti-deficiency statutes whether made before or after a nonjudicial
foreclosure.
A pre-foreclosure draw upon a letter of credit results in an imposi-
tion of the one-action/security-first sanction: loss of additional real
property security. This is the result that must be reached because a
pre-foreclosure draw subjects the borrower to multiple actions and
allows the lender to obtain the equivalent of a pre-nonjudicial fore-
closure deficiency judgment. The application of the restrictions of
section 726(a) restrictions will eviscerate the usefulness of letters of
credit when used as security in combination with real property.
B. The Vanishing Utility of Letters of Credit
Placing the limits of sections 580(d) and 726(a) on letters of
credit eliminates most of their utility as credit enhancers when used
in combination with real property security. To illustrate why this is
so, reconsider the hypothetical involving the bank that gave a loan
secured by the wildlife shopping center.0 5 Assume that in addition
to the shopping center the bank obtained a $1,000,000 letter of
103. Hetland, supra note 41, at 35 n.158. "[I]f a creditor chooses to secure an
obligation with an interest in real property, he does so at a significant price. That price
includes the following limitations on the creditor's rights and remedies: (1) No personal
(deficiency) judgment against a debtor is allowed without first exhausting the security;
." Hetland & Hansen, supra note 26, at 194. See also Pacific Valley Bank v.
Schwenke, 189 Cal. App. 3d 134, 234 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1987); Bank of Am. v. Daily, 152
Cal. App. 3d 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1984).
104. If this were held not to violate section 726(a), pre-foreclosure letter of credit
draws would become the "'artifice of choice' to avoid . . . [section 580(d)'s] limita-
tions." Western Sec. Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 1463, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920.
105. For a discussion of the shopping center hypothetical see supra part II.C.
credit it could draw upon by presenting drafts stating that the bor-
rower was in default. If the borrower defaults on the underlying loan
and is experiencing difficulties similar to the borrower in the original
hypothetical, the bank might attempt one of the following courses of
action: (1) draw on the letter of credit and then institute either non-
judicial or judicial foreclosure proceedings on the shopping center,
(2) institute a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding and after the prop-
erty is sold draw upon the letter of credit to obtain a deficiency equal
to the excess of the debt over the proceeds from the nonjudicial sale,
or (3) institute a judicial foreclosure proceeding and use the letter of
credit to recover any deficiency that is remaining.
Each of these options has consequences similar to those encoun-
tered in the shopping center loan hypothetical. First, as discussed
previously, a pre-foreclosure draw should subject the lender to a sec-
tion 726(a) loss of remaining security sanction. Second, according to
Western Security Bank, a draw on the letter of credit after a nonju-
dicial foreclosure will be barred by section 580(d). Third, a bank
desiring expediency because of a borrower's deteriorating financial
condition will not have its needs satisfied by a time-consuming judi-
cial foreclosure. In addition, a letter may be worthless in the context
of judicial foreclosure because Western Security Bank's assertion
that letters of credit can be drawn on after the conclusion of a judi-
cial foreclosure proceeding does not comport with commercial
reality:
The Western Security Court . . . suggests that a lender/beneficiary could
wait to draw on a letter of credit until after it judicially forecloses without
violating Section 580d. As a practical matter, however, this is not an option.
Letters of credit generally are short in duration, requiring yearly renewal. A
letter of credit normally will expire prior to the completion of a judicial
foreclosure action, leaving the lender/beneficiary with nothing to draw
on.
06
In, sum, judicial foreclosure will provide the best chance for a
lender to collect on both its letter of credit and real property secur-
ity. If the letter of credit term expires while waiting for judicial fore-
closure to be concluded, the lender will have to choose whether to
collect the letter of credit amount or look to the proceeds of the judi-
cial sale of the real property security; it will not have the benefit of
both. Therefore, in most cases, the letter of credit will serve not as a
106. Amicus Brief for the Irvine Company at 8 n.8, Western Sec. Bank v. Beverly
Hills Business Bank, 21 Cal. App. 4th 156, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908 (1993) (No. B066488)
(prepared pursuant to California Rule of Court 14(b) urging the California Supreme
Court to grant review of the Western Security Bank decision) [hereinafter Irvine Brief]
(emphasis added); Dennis B. Arnold, Western Security Bank, Part Deux: The Empire
Strikes Out, CAL. REAL PROP. J., Winter 1994, at 30, 31 (noting that a judicial foreclo-
sure prior to drawing upon a letter of credit simply ignores the reality that letters of
credit are typically short-term instruments which will often expire during the pendency
of a judicial foreclosure proceeding).
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credit enhancer to be used to collect the debt in combination with
real property security, but will merely provide the lender with a
choice of recourse - collect upon either the letter of credit or the
real property. In most cases, because letters of credit are generally
issued for a fraction of the total debt amount, the lender will proceed
against the real property because it should provide a superior source
of funds. The net result is that letters of credit will be of diminished
value when used for credit enhancement in combination with real
property security.
More generally, the result in Western Security Bank also impinges
upon the central strength of letters of credit in allowing transacting
parties to economically customize who will assume specific risks.1"'
Letters of credit are a method to customize risks at minimal costs
because (1) the lender gains from the mechanical and expedient pay-
ment, 108 (2) the administrative expenses involved are relatively low
due to the automatic nature of payment,' 0 9 (3) the issuer will often
be able to avoid the duplicative expenses of investigating and moni-
toring the underlying contract because it will be familiar with the
transaction and the customer's creditworthiness, 10 and (4) the risk
of litigation can be shifted from the lender to the borrower."'
Treating letters of credit in accord with the Western Security
Bank opinion will increase their cost, eliminate the benefit they pro-
vide in shifting risks, and provide the analytical basis for making
pre-foreclosure draws a violation of the security first corollary of the
one-action rule. The cost of letters of credit will rise because the
issuer will feel obligated to consider the status of the underlying
transaction to insure she will not incur liability for improperly honor-
ing the draft. Additionally, the Western Security Bank's expansion
of the "fraud in the transaction" exception makes it more likely liti-
gation will occur before a letter of credit is honored." 2 This under-
mines the risk shifting mechanism of letters of credit by increasing
the risk to the lender that funds will be tied up during a valid dis-
pute. Finally, as discussed above, because Western Security Bank
107. See Stern, supra note 22, at 222-24.
108. Joseph D. Becker, Standby Letters of Credit and the Iranian Cases: Will the
Independence of the Credit Survive?, 13 UCC L.J. 335, 339 (1981).
109. Leo H. Garman, Standby Letter of Credit and Guarantees: Do We Under-
stand What We're Doing?, J. COM. BANK LENDING, Apr. 1978, at 3.
110. See Stern, supra note 22, at 225.
111. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
112. "[T]he standby letter of credit reduces the probability of judicial involvement,
thus enabling the parties to evaluate the risks involved with a standby letter of credit
more accurately." Stern, supra note 22, at 224-25 n.41.
precludes draws after a nonjudicial foreclosure, it provides the ra-
tionale that logically leads to a loss of real property security under
section 726(a) if letters are drawn upon before foreclosure. As a re-
sult, borrowers and lenders will have their current access to the fi-
nancial soundness of banking institutions, through the use of letters
of credit as credit enhancers in combination with real property,
eliminated.
113
The Western Security Bank court chose to vindicate the anti-defi-
ciency legislation at the expense of the vitality of letters of credit as
currently used in real estate financing. This result should not be al-
lowed to stand. Instead, action must be taken to insure that letters of
credit continue to play their important role in fueling real estate
financing.
V. SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION
As discussed above, the Western Security Bank opinion suffers
from serious deficiencies. To prevent further aggravation of the ill-
ness currently afflicting the California real estate market it is essen-
tial that letters of credit retain their usefulness. Accordingly, this
part considers possible judicial and legislative solutions.
A. Can the Independence Principle Be Saved Without Departing
from Judicial Precedent?
The weakness of the Western Security Bank decision lies in its
attempt to square the public policies underlying the anti-deficiency
legislation with the independence principle upon which letters of
credit are based. The court recognized that one of these two provi-
sions must yield to the other:
If we conclude that . . . [when a beneficiary of a letter of credit draws
upon such letter after a nonjudicial foreclosure] an issuer has no alternative
but to honor the payment demand then we effectively have subordinated the
antideficiency legislation to the need for commercial certainty upon which
the independence principle is predicated. On the other hand, if we hold that
an issuer, on the facts before us, cannot properly honor a request for pay-
ment on standby letters, then we have done the opposite. We cannot....
completely vindicate both of these competing statutory policies."4
The court purported to avoid this quandary by reconciling section
113. Letters of credit allow parties to take advantage of the financial soundness of
banking institutions that would not otherwise be available because banks are precluded
from issuing alternative credit enhancement tools such as guarantees or performance
bonds. See, e.g., HENRY HARFEILD. BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 163-65 (5th ed.
1974); Richard A. Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the Standby Letter of Credit, 96
BANKING L.J. 46-47 (1979).
114. Western Sec. Bank v. Beverly Hills Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441,
1463, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 920 (1993), review granted, 871 P.2d 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d
151 (1994) (emphasis added).
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580(d) with the independence principle so as to give effect to the
apparent intent of the legislature.11 5 However, as previously men-
tioned, in the process the court mangled the independence principle
by resorting to an overexpansive reading of "fraud in the transac-
tion. ' 116 The Western Security Bank opinion has resulted in substan-
tial criticism.117  However, what these critics have failed to
sufficiently articulate is a way in which the court could have escaped
from the dilemma described above without sacrificing either the in-
dependence principle or section 580(d) as previously interpreted by
the California judiciary.""
In Western Security Bank, the Bank's best argument for drawing
upon the letter of credit post-foreclosure was to characterize the
draw not as a deficiency judgment, but rather as an attempt to re-
cover from the issuer under an obligation separate and distinct from
that of the underlying notes secured by the deed of trust. The Bank
argued that its draw was not a deficiency judgment, but instead a
contract recovery under its agreement with the Vista partners. How-
ever, this argument ignored prior California cases which provided a
more expansive interpretation of section 580(d). The court was
bound by this line of cases giving a broad construction to the defini-
tion of deficiency judgment.
In Union Bank v. Gradsky,11 9 a California appellate court held
115. The court stated: "We must therefore seek a way to reconcile ... [these two
statutory policies]. It is the duty of courts, when reasonably possible, to harmonize [stat-
utory provisions] so as to give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." Id. (citing
Stowe v. Merrilees, 6 Cal. App. 2d 217, 220, 44 P.2d 368, 369 (1935)) (second alteration
in original).
116. See CBA Brief, supra note 10, at 12.
What the Court of Appeal did in this case was to achieve a result that the
Court thought attractive by marshaling the "fraud" exception to the indepen-
dence principle. But the resulting consequence of that decision is to seriously
broaden the definition of fraud in real property secured transactions .... In-
stead of clarifying the law, the Court of Appeal has introduced great
uncertainty.
The elevation of a breach of a representation newly implied in law to the
level of fraud also raises troublesome issues outside the letter of credit context.
Is the beneficiary liable for punitive damages? What other consequences flow
from a finding of fraud? The Court of Appeal has opened a Pandora's box.
Id.
117. See supra note 91.
118. The Western Security Bank court itself may have been implicitly recognizing
potential harm it had inflicted upon the independence principle when it stated that it had
"reconcile[d] these competing statutory provisions and policies without doing undue
damage to either." Western Sec. Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 1466, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
922 (emphasis added).
119. 265 Cal. App. 2d 40, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1968).
that a lender could not collect from a guarantor of a promissory note
secured by real property after foreclosing nonjudicially upon the real
property securing the debt. Gradsky pointed out that "[i]f . . the
guarantor . . . can successfully assert an action . . . against [the
borrower] for reimbursement, the obvious result is to permit the re-
covery of a 'deficiency' judgment against the [borrower] following a
nonjudicial sale of the security under a different label. 120 Gradsky
clearly stands for the proposition that section 580(d) does not permit
any liability, either direct or indirect, to be imposed upon a borrower
after a nonjudicial foreclosure. 1
21
Even if the court had ignored Gradsky, it would have been faced
with precedent even more difficult to distinguish. In Commonwealth
Mortgage Assurance Co. v. Superior Court,122 another California
appellate court opinion, a couple purchased three condominium units
with a loan secured by promissory notes. The bank who provided the
loan required the couple to obtain mortgage guarantee insurance pol-
icies to secure payment on the notes. 23 The couple signed indemnity
agreements promising to reimburse the mortgage insurer for any
funds paid out under the policy. The couple defaulted on the notes
and the bank foreclosed nonjudicially on the real property. The bank
then collected on the mortgage insurance and the mortgage insurer
brought an action on the indemnity agreement.124 The court held
that section 580(d) precluded the mortgage insurer's enforcement of
the indemnity agreements. 25
The Commonwealth court relied heavily on Gradsky to reach the
same result. The court stated: "[W]e find the facts herein substan-
tially similar . . . to those in [Gradsky] and conclude that the in-
demnity agreements herein are nothing more than attempts to
recover a deficiency in violation of the antideficiency statute.' 26
Later in its opinion, the Commonwealth court sounded what was
probably the death knell of any chance that letters of credit could be
distinguished from indemnity agreements:
The question we must now address is whether the execution of the indem-
nity agreements by ... [the borrowers] sufficiently distinguishes their situ-
ation from the debtor in Gradsky. We conclude it does not. The instant
indemnity agreements add nothing to the liability . . . [the borrower's]
already incurred as principal obligors on the notes .... To splinter the
120. Id. at 45-46, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 68-69 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 46, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 69. "The Legislature clearly intended to protect
the debtor from personal liability following a nonjudicial sale of the security. No liability,
direct or indirect, should be imposed upon the debtor following a nonjudicial sale of the
security." Id.
122. 211 Cal. App. 3d 508, 259 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1989).
123. Id. at 512, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 517, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 430.
126. Id. at 515, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 428 (emphasis added).
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transaction and view the indemnity agreements as separate and indepen-
dent obligations. . . is to thwart the purpose of section 580d by a subter-
fuge, a result we cannot permit.
1 27
Gradsky and Commonwealth left the Western Security Bank
court with little room to maneuver. An alternative that would have
left the independence principle intact would have been to distinguish
these cases by characterizing them as grounded in subrogation law.
This, however, would not be a principled distinction because the in-
demnity obligation in Commonwealth provided a contract to base
collection upon and thus subrogation law was not directly in issue,
and Gradsky and Commonwealth both contain sweeping language
that clearly prevents the imposition of any personal liability, either
direct or indirect, regardless of the application of the subrogation
doctrine, following a nonjudicial sale of security. As the Western Se-
curity Bank court accurately stated:
Gradsky and Commonwealth reflect the strong judicial concern about the
efforts of secured real property lenders to circumvent section 580d by the
use of financial transactions between debtors and third parties which involve
post nonjudicial foreclosure debt obligations for the borrowers. Their com-
mon and primary focus is on the lender's requirement that the debtor make
arrangements with a third party to pay a portion of all of the mortgage debt
remaining after a foreclosure, i.e., to pay the debtor's deficiency. 28
The court could not vindicate the policies underlying the indepen-
dence principle while acknowledging the "judicial concern about
...efforts. . . to circumvent section 580d.'3 29 The Western Secur-
ity Bank court chose to leave anti-deficiency protections unscathed
at the expense of what may be the continued vitality of the indepen-
dence principle. The only options open to the court were either to
ignore these cases or distinguish them on overly technical grounds.' 30
127. Id. at 517, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 429-30 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
128. Western Sec. Bank v. Beverly Hills Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441,
1457, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 916 (1993), review granted, 871 P.2d 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d
151 (1994).
129. Id.
130. The dissent in Western Security Bank argued that the sections could be rec-
onciled without resort to the "fraud in the transaction" exception by allowing the lender
to draw on the letter of credit and by providing that the borrower can seek disgorgement
from the lender based on the section 580(d) violation. Western Sec. Bank, 26 Cal. App.
4th at 1471, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925-26 (Kitching, J., dissenting). Although requiring
the issuer to honor the draw would have been preferable to the majority's decision be-
cause it would not label the draw as "fraud," as a practical matter this approach would
still impose a "temporary" deficiency judgment on the borrower. The result of allowing a
lender to draw on the letter of credit after a nonjudicial foreclosure would be the issuer
seeking immediate reimbursement from the borrower. These funds would be sought at a
time when the borrower is most likely in dire financial trouble. Any judgment against the
borrower for the reimbursement funds would aggravate the borrower's financial position
As discussed above, California courts have traditionally been un-
sympathetic to proposed limits on the application of the judicially
evolved anti-deficiency doctrine, especially where these limits would
restrict the prior holdings of well-established cases such as Gradsky
and Commonwealth.13 1 Consequently, it will probably be left to the
Legislature to solve the problems posed by the Western Security
Bank decision.
B. A Legislative Proposal: Exempt Letters of Credit from the
Anti-Deficiency Statutes
In Western Security Bank, the court recognized that its resolution
of the clash between the letter of credit doctrine and the anti-defi-
ciency legislation was insufficient and that the ultimate solution
would have to be provided by the Legislature:
To the extent that this result will present problems for real estate lenders
with respect to the way they now do business .... it is a matter which
should be addressed to the Legislature. We have been presented with two
important but conflicting statutory policies. Our reconciliation of them in
this case may not prove as satisfactory in another factual context. It is
therefore a matter which should receive early legislative attention."'
The California Legislature should accept the court's invitation to
solve this statutory conflict. The Legislature should amend the Cali-
fornia Commercial Code to provide that letters of credit used in
commercial real estate financing can be drawn upon irrespective of
proceedings to foreclose on real property securing the same obliga-
tion. This amendment would not conflict with the policies of the anti-
and could also adversely affect other creditors, especially if the issuer's reimbursement
obligation is secured. In addition, in many cases the borrower would have to expend
funds in the form of legal fees to secure disgorgement from the lender. Following the
dissent's approach would not infringe upon the independence principle, but in substance,
would impose the equivalent of a deficiency judgment upon the borrower. Consequently,
it is very unlikely that the courts will adopt this approach in the future. However, note
that by allowing the issuer the option of funding the draw, the Western Security Bank
holding will often result in this "temporary" deficiency judgment being imposed upon the
borrower. This is another indication of the inconsistencies embraced by the Western Se-
curity Bank majority.
131. Ironically, Western Security Bank hurts borrowers - the parties which the
anti-deficiency legislation was enacted to help:
The Court's decision puts at risk literally billions of dollars in real property
secured loans that presently rely on letters of credit as additional credit sup-
port. In general, letters of credit must be renewed yearly. Thus, as the present
outstanding letters of credit expire, lenders will require borrowers to put up
other forms of security. For many borrowers, this will mean pledging needed
working capital. Those borrowers that are unable to provide such additional
security will default on their loans. Clearly, the Court's decision hurts the very
persons the anti-deficiency laws were intended to protect ... .
Irvine Brief, supra note 106, at 8-9.
132. Western See. Bank v. Beverly Hills Business Bank, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1441,
1466, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 908, 921 (1993), review granted, 871 P.2d 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d
151 (1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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deficiency legislation because the transactions in which letters of
credit are used typically involve commercial borrowers who are not
at a significant disadvantage in bargaining power. Such an amend-
ment would also bring the treatment of letters of credit in line with
the treatment of other instruments governed by the Commercial
Code and concurrently used as partial security in real estate
transactions.
1. The Policy of the Anti-Deficiency Legislation
The anti-deficiency legislation is the product of the "need, during
the Great Depression of the 1930's, to halt the wholesale destruction
of the small landowner class."' 133 It arose from the "legislative abhor-
rence of the all too common foreclosures and forfeitures occurring
during that era for reasons beyond the control of the debtors."'
1 34
The objective was to protect residential borrowers with a disadvan-
tage in borrowing power from a loss of not only most or all of their
personal wealth, but also the basic necessities such as shelter and the
means of earning a livelihood.
The original legislation did not distinguish between commercial
and residential borrowers and, with one exception, the current stat-
utes also do not distinguish between the two. This exception, section
580(b), provides support for the proposed amendment. Section
580(b) prevents a deficiency where the security consists of a struc-
ture of no more than four units occupied in whole or in part by the
borrower (in essence, residential borrowers).' 35 Thus, the anti-defi-
ciency statutes support the policy of protecting residential borrowers
with limited bargaining power, while limiting the protection provided
to sophisticated commercial borrowers.
Three additional reasons support the argument that the legislative
policies embodied in the anti-deficiency legislation are not applicable
to most real estate transactions involving letters of credit. First, let-
ters of credit are normally not used in transactions involving parties
which the anti-deficiency legislation was enacted to protect. Typi-
cally, letters of credit are issued to relatively large commercial bor-
rowers. These borrowers are not the residential homeowners the
133. BERNDARDT, supra note 5, at 185.
134. Hetland & Hansen, supra note 26, at 188.
135. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 1991). See generally Roseleaf Corp.
v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963); Brown v. Jensen
41 Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953); Palm v. Schilling, 199 Cal. App. 3d 63, 244 Cal.
Rptr. 600 (1988).
Legislature deemed worthy of protection from loss of the necessities
of life.13 18 Accordingly, the Legislature should recognize that the dis-
tinction between commercial and residential borrowers is relevant
with respect to the interaction of letters of credit and the anti-defi-
ciency legislation.1
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Secondly, borrowers in transactions that include a letter of credit
do not need, nor do they necessarily deserve, the protections provided
by the anti-deficiency legislation. Because letters of credit are used
by commercial borrowers, the transactions in which they are used do
not suffer from the unequal bargaining positions typically encoun-
tered in residential financing.
Third, letters of credit do not undermine the parties' expectations.
The anti-deficiency legislation is an attempt to uphold the expecta-
tions of parties to a credit transaction that is secured by real prop-
erty by requiring that the lender resort to the real property for
primary recourse. When sophisticated parties with equal bargaining
power voluntarily enter into an agreement to allow the lender to re-
cover on a letter of credit if the borrower defaults, they have formed
their expectations in a way that is not advanced, but instead frus-
trated, by the anti-deficiency statutes. Therefore, the policies that
underlie the anti-deficiency legislation are inapplicable to real estate
financing transactions that include letters of credit.
2. The Precedent for Exempting Letters of Credit from
the Anti-Deficiency Legislation
Precedent supports the amendment this Note proposes. The condi-
tions surrounding Western Security Bank are similar to those which
resulted in the "mixed collateral" amendments to the California
Commercial Code. The "mixed collateral" amendments were
prompted by California courts subordinating division 9 of the Cali-
fornia Commercial Code to the anti-deficiency legislation. Similarly,
Western Security Bank subordinated division 5 of the Commercial
Code to the anti-deficiency rules.
Before 1986, when a single obligation was secured by both real
and personal property, creating the "mixed collateral" problem, the
real property enforcement scheme which embodies the anti-defi-
ciency legislation was exclusively applied. This was the procedure
the courts chose despite the fact these obligations were also secured
136. Irvine Brief, supra note 106, at 3 n.2 ("Letters of credit are virtually never
used in real estate transactions involving private homeowners.").
137. Real estate law consistently treats commercial borrowers differently than resi-
dential borrowers. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 1994). See generally
HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 122-28 (2d ed.
1989).
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by personal property subject to division 9 of the California Commer-
cial Code.
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In 1985, the California Legislature amended California Commer-
cial Code section 9501(4).139 This amendment allows real and per-
sonal property to be pursued in whichever order the lender chooses
without impairing the other form of security. In enacting this
amendment, the Legislature overruled the previous judicial determi-
nation that the real property enforcement scheme would provide the
exclusive rules in the "mixed collateral" problem. This amendment
essentially provides that personal property security will be governed
solely by the rules of the California Commercial Code, and real
property security by the "elaborate and interrelated set of anti-defi-
ciency and foreclosure statutes." 4 °
Letters of credit are covered by California Commercial Code divi-
sion 5.141 Therefore, as in the "mixed collateral problem," in the
context of letters of credit there are two financing instruments (the
letter of credit and the real property security), each with a distinct
set of rules governing their use. By applying the anti-deficiency rules
to letters of credit the judiciary has allowed these statutes to trump
the Commercial Code rules regarding letters of credit.' 42 The Legis-
lature should take action, just as they did with the "mixed collat-
eral" amendments, to insure that the requirements of division 5 of
the Commercial Code are not ignored.
Comparing the "mixed collateral" amendments to a potential
amendment providing special treatment for letters of credit illus-
trates that letters of credit are even more deserving of an exemption
from the real property foreclosure rules. By allowing lenders to draw
on letters of credit and proceed against personal property in a man-
ner unfettered by the anti-deficiency rules, the parties' expectations
138. CAL. COM. CODE §§ 9102-9508 (West 1994). See generally Hetland & Han-
sen, supra note 26, at 185-86; Morris W. Hirsch et al., The U.C.C. Mixed Collateral
Statute - Has Paradise Really Been Lost?, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1988).
139. CAL. CONI. CODE § 9501(4) (West Supp. 1987) (amendments effective Janu-
ary 1, 1986).
140. Hetland & Hansen, supra note 26, at 185.
141. CAL. CONI. CODE §§ 5101-5117 (West 1994).
142. Note that Western Security Bank attempts to take this tack by applying the
California Commercial Code's rules in conjunction with the anti-deficiency limits. This is
done by holding that a draw violates section 580(d) and thus constitutes "fraud in the
transaction" under California Commercial Code section 5114(2)(b). See CAL. COM.
CODE § 5114(2)(b) (West 1994). However, as discussed above, the use of the "fraud in
the transaction" exception was simply misdirection used by the court to obscure its ac-
tual holding: Section 580(d) applies despite the conflicting rules governing the letter of
credit doctrine. See supra part III.C.
are upheld. Unlike letters of credit, personal property security is typ-
ically used in both residential and commercial lending transactions.
Therefore, the transactions which include personal property involve
many residential borrowers with markedly unequal bargaining
power. As discussed above, these are the parties that the anti-defi-
ciency legislation was intended to protect. Exempting letters of
credit from the anti-deficiency statutes would have no effect on these
parties.
The Legislature should amend the California Commercial Code to
exempt letters of credit from the anti-deficiency legislation. 43 Sub-
jecting letters of credit to these statutes simply provides protection to
large commercial borrowers who can take care of themselves.
CONCLUSION
Western Security Bank impairs the usefulness of letters of credit
by expanding the "fraud in the transaction" exception to the extent
that it threatens to swallow the independence principle, and by pro-
viding the rationale for subjecting pre-foreclosure draws to section
726(a) limits. Western Security Bank creates an uncertainty in the
place of the guaranteed and mechanical payment that letters of
credit are meant to provide. This Note proposes that the California
Legislature should end this uncertainty by enacting an amendment
to the California Commercial Code providing that letters of credit be
governed solely by division 5 of the Commercial Code. Accordingly,
draws would not be limited in any way by the anti-deficiency stat-
utes. Exempting letters of credit from the anti-deficiency legislation
would not undermine the general policies upon which these statutes
are based because letters of credit are typically used by commercial
143. An alternative solution would be to allow draws upon letters of credit used in
combination with real property security only when the lender proceeds against the real
property in a judicial foreclosure action. Under this rule a letter of credit beneficiary
could draw on the letter either (1) pre-foreclosure on the condition that the beneficiary
only proceed against the property in a later judicial foreclosure, or (2) post foreclosure as
long as the foreclosure was done judicially. This would only change current law with
regard to pre-foreclosure draws, assuming they are held to violate section 726(a), be-
cause drawing post judicial foreclosure is currently acceptable (but note the problem of
the letter expiring due to its short-term nature). This treatment would ensure letters of
credit retain some of their commercial utility while not allowing them to be used as a
vehicle to impose a deficiency judgment, either pre- or post-nonjudicial foreclosure, upon
a borrower who is denied the right of redemption and a fair value hearing. However, as
discussed in this part, letter of credit draws do not threaten the legislative policies behind
the anti-deficiency statutes. Therefore, exempting letters of credit altogether from the
anti-deficiency legislation is the superior treatment. The Legislature has enacted Com-
mercial Code division 5 to govern letters of credit. Real property is governed by the anti-
deficiency rules and foreclosure statutes. Accordingly, a real estate financing transaction
which includes both a letter of credit and real property security should be treated similar
to the "mixed collateral problem" - allow the statutory section which governs the in-
strument determine how the instrument can be proceeded against.
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borrowers and in transactions that do not involve overreaching.
Moreover, allowing lenders to draw on letters of credit does not frus-
trate, but instead upholds, the intention of parties to real estate
financing.
This Note's proposed amendment would not be unprecedented; the
rules that Western Security Bank established to govern letters of
credit are similar to the judicial treatment of personal property se-
curity before the "mixed collateral" amendments. Because letters of
credit are generally used only by commercial borrowers, whereas
personal property security is often used by residential borrowers,
there are more weighty policy reasons for exempting letters of credit
from the anti-deficiency rules than there were for providing the per-
sonal property exemption created by the enactment of California
Commercial Code section 9501.
Denying California borrowers the option of using letters of credit
in the financing and restructuring of real property loans serves only
to exacerbate the current real estate downturn. Letters of credit are
especially important during a time of depressed real estate prices be-
cause they may provide the only viable means to support continued
development and allow necessary refinancing.144 The legislative
amendment proposed in this Note ensures that letters of credit are
not rendered useless; the California real estate market cannot afford
any further aggravation of its currently anemic condition.
ADDENDUM
On September 15, 1994, Governor Pete Wilson approved urgency
legislation to amend section 2787 of the Civil Code, to add sections
580.5 and 580.7 to the Code of Civil Procedure, and to amend sec-
tion 5114 of the Commercial Code.145 The most significant features
of this legislation are:
1. Section 2787 of the Civil Code is amended to state that a letter of
credit is not a suretyship obligation.
2. Section 580.5 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide
that drawing upon a letter of credit supporting an obligation
which is also secured by a mortgage or deed of trust upon real
property does not constitute (i) an action within the meaning of
subdivision (a) of section 726, (ii) a money judgment for a defi-
ciency or a deficiency judgment within the meaning of section
144. Irvine Brief, supra note 106, at 3.
145. 1994 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 611 (Deering).
580a, 580b, and 580d, or subdivision (b) of Section 726, or (iii) a
violation of sections 580a, 580b, 580d, or 726.
3. Section 580.7 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure to preclude
the enforcement of a letter of credit if (i) the customer is a natu-
ral person, (ii) the letter of credit is issued to the beneficiary to
avoid a default of the existing loan, (iii) the existing loan is se-
cured by a purchase money deed of trust or purchase money
mortgage on real property containing one to four residential units,
at least one of which is owned and occupied or was intended at
the time the existing loan was made, to be occupied by the cus-
tomer, and (iv) the letter of credit is issued after the effective
date of this section.
The stated intent of the Legislature in approving this enactment
was to
confirm the independent nature of the letter of credit engagement and to
abrogate the holding in Western Security Bank . . [and] to confirm the
expectations of the parties to a contract that underlies a letter of credit,
that the beneficiary will have available the value of the real estate collateral
and the benefit of the letter of credit without regard to the order in which
the beneficiary may resort to either.
1 4
6
The urgency legislation is effective on September 15, 1994; non-ur-
gency legislation will become effective January 1, 1995.
MONTE M. BREM
146. Id.
